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Strategic environment of eaSt aSia 
in 2017–18 analySiS of Key trendS and iSSueS
Looking from the perspective of late May 2018 (when this article was completed) the 
preceding 12 months look as a tumultuous period for East Asia’s international security 
environment. The ebb and flow of tension and détente which characterized many re-
gional crisis (Korea being primary example) seemed to accelerate rising expectations 
of important shifts in some key issue areas shaping regional order. At the same time it 
seems that the underlying, long term, strategic background of power shift and peren-
nial regional flashpoints comes out of this period not only unaltered, but even strength-
ened. This state of affairs creates a need for a complex analysis, taking into account 
both the underlying structure of East Asian international order and shifts brought by 
recent events.
This article is the second instalment in the series initiated by the “Strategic Re-
view” in its 2017 edition. Its aim is to track the evolution of international security 
environment of particular regions by putting current events into a broader strategic 
context. It proceeds in the following order. First, it sketches out long term trends shap-
ing the region’s strategic environment which together form a “strategic background” 
of international relations of East Asia. Second, key events of 2017 (and early months 
of 2018) are being analysed in relation to the aforementioned long-term trends. Finally, 
the author presents some remarks on the prospects for the region’s strategic evolution 
in the coming 12–18 months.
Strategic BacKground of eaSt aSia’S  
international Security environment
Regional strategic background, as understood for the purpose of this article consists 
of (semi)permanent features of geopolitical setting, as well as long term trends in 
interactions among main strategic actors. This article deals with East Asia, which 
is understood as encompassing the land area bordering the West Pacific Basin. It 
includes such states and territories as: the Russian Far East, Japan, Democratic Peo-
ple’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, People’s Republic of China, Republic 
of China (Taiwan), Mongolia and member states of the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar) (Gawlikowski, 2004: 21). Three long term fea-
tures characterize its geopolitical setting: high concentration of economic and mili-
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tary power, low institutionalization of regional security cooperation and long term 
international conflicts.
East Asia’s role in the global international system is a product of its economic 
prowess and growing militarization. In 2015 the wider Asia Pacific region accounted 
for 29% of global GDP and hosted 5 of the 20 biggest economies in the world (China, 
Japan, South Korea, Russia and Indonesia) (World Bank, 2015). This economic heft is 
being increasingly used to strengthen military arsenals. In 2016 East Asia was home to 
four of the 15 biggest defence spenders in the world (China, Russia, Japan and South 
Korea). Together they accounted for 22% of the global defence expenditures (Trends 
in, 2017). In consequence, East Asia is populated by strong nation states and several 
major powers which are the main actors shaping its international security environment. 
For that reason the key issues of international security in this region deal with inter-
state relations. That is the reason why the analysis presented in this article focuses on 
great power relations and traditional (hard) security issues. Naturally, it doesn’t mean 
that non-state actors and non-traditional security issues are absent from the regional 
agenda (especially in the sub region of South East Asia). However, it is the conscious 
decision of the author to focus on inter-state security relations as the focal point of 
regional security.
Another defining feature of East Asia’s geopolitical setting is the relatively low 
level of institutionalization of security cooperation. East Asia lacks any regional or-
ganization which could be a regional pact under the provisions of the UN Charter’s 
Chapter VIII. Several consultative fora exist (like the ASEAN Regional Forum, East 
Asia Summit or Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia) and they 
tend to be rather inclusive in terms of membership. However, they lack norm mak-
ing powers and enforcement mechanisms, thus limiting their ability to regulate in-
teractions among regional actors. In the last couple of years the region has witnessed 
a greater activity in terms of institution building. It includes Chinese efforts at creating 
a new regional institutional architecture centred on the Belt and Road Initiative and 
including such entities as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Belt and Road 
Forum. On the other hand, the re-launch of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (“the Quad”) 
among Australia, India, Japan and United States might sow the seeds for further in-
stitutionalisation of these states’ security cooperation. Even if not all activities are 
strictly security related, they can provide basis for increased future cooperation and 
coordination in this realm. Although these initiatives will be more closely analysed in 
further parts of the article, it is important to note at this point that they can be viewed 
not as attempts at creating inclusive region-wide institutions, but rather as the region’s 
dominant powers – US and China- building competing institutions.
The final defining feature of (semi)permanent geopolitical setting in East Asia is 
the presence of numerous long standing international disputes and conflicts. They can 
be broadly divided into three categories 1) unresolved cold war conflicts (the division 
of China and Korea) 2) territorial disputes (mostly of maritime nature) 3) broader ri-
valry for politico-military dominance in the region. These disputes and conflicts touch 
on vital national security interests of the region’s most important actors, which often 
make them the central issues in bilateral (and sometimes multilateral) relations. This 
dynamic is visible in the cases of Korean conflict (currently revolving around North 
	 Strategic	Environment	of	East	Asia	in	2017–18	Analysis	of	Key	Trends	and	Issues	 397
Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal) and the South China Sea (with growing Chinese 
militarisation of disputed features and increasing military activity of concerned par-
ties). During the last couple of years intensity of both conflicts has oscillated between 
heightened tensions and signs of tentative détente. This has been especially visible in 
the Korean case (as will be described in greater detail later in the article). Preliminary 
conclusion drawn from these observations is that despite many twists and turns the 
situation on the ground changes little, reinforcing the conflicts’ position as relatively 
permanent features of the regional security environment. However, it can be claimed 
that current trends reinforce the position of states considered as revisionist towards the 
existing regional order.
The previous section has named (semi)permanent features of East Asia’s geopoliti-
cal setting. They all reinforce the point (adopted as one of the base assumptions for 
this article) that East Asia’s regional security environment is the domain of traditional 
interstate relations revolving around rather traditional security issues of territorial con-
trol, competition for influence and military build-ups. Such geopolitical setting can be 
viewed as a metaphorical strategic chessboard on which a dynamic game of interna-
tional relations is being played. Looking from a broad perspective, two trends in this 
game stand out. One is the growing bipolarity, with China and USA as main protago-
nists. Second concerns the attempts of lesser powers at maintaining at least some de-
gree of independence and diplomatic “breathing space” in this bipolar environment.
Practically every analysis of the global balance of power shows that United States 
and China are the only two states which currently possess superpower potential 
(Brooks, Wohlforth, 2015; Wiśniewski, Hensarling, 2015). There is even a growing 
tendency to profess imminent global bipolar power configuration (Heisbourg, 2018). 
Such far reaching assessments may seem premature when it comes to the global level. 
However, it is far less contentious to perceive US and China as dominant actors in the 
East Asian region. China clearly does not have a peer competitor among regional states 
and can increasingly play this role vis-à-vis United States. Sino-US rivalry has a long 
history. However, it is widely argued that it entered new phase somewhere around 
years 2008–2012 when the financial crisis combined with change of guard at the top of 
the Chinese Communist Party brought a more assertive Chinese bid for leadership and 
construction of regional order. Looking at the current state of East Asian international 
security environment we can see growing Sino-US divergence concerning attitudes 
towards regional international order. Both states clearly champion competing visions 
of East Asia’s future. This plays out at several levels. First, China is no longer shy 
about articulating alternative set of principles on which international order should be 
based. They centre around a desire for political and ideational pluralism, understand as 
a freedom of sovereign nation states to maintain distinct political and economic mod-
els. This stands in contrast with consistent US desire to promote liberal values around 
the world (Feng Zhang, 2018). Alternative visions of political order are accompanied 
by different models of economic development. Takashi Terada describes the as mar-
ket and developmental models (Terada, 2018). The differences have been made even 
clearer when the Trump administration proposed “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as its 
vision for the region’s future. The concept is still vague. However, basically it seems 
to restate the well-known tenets of America-lead liberal institutional order (such as 
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freedom of navigation, rule of law, free market economy etc.) supplemented with new 
found emphasis on sovereignty and independence. All of this is being positioned as 
opposite to more “closed” Chinese vision (Smith, 2018; Ford, 2018).
These competing visions bring separate institutional initiatives. Each of the main 
players proposes its own set of institutions and cooperation initiatives which look in-
creasingly as aimed at excluding one another. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is 
the prime example of this. It is often viewed in Washington as undermining World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank (although the reality on the ground is significantly differ-
ent). The entire Belt and Road Initiative is also perceived as a starting point for a sepa-
rate trading bloc, which with time can spawn its own organizational architecture. When 
coupled with unrelenting arms race and growing adversarial mindset it is clear that East 
Asian is becoming a playground for a bipolar great power competition with most (if not 
all) regional issues, disputes and conflicts subsumed into this bipolar structure.
This trend towards domination of regional affairs by two greatest powers was dis-
cernible for most of the post-cold war period. Thus, it is not surprising that it has cre-
ated the second countervailing tendency – for region’s lesser powers to seek greater 
autonomy and freedom of action in this constraining environment. This had been vis-
ible in South Korea’s attempts at achieving equilibrium between its treaty ally (US) 
on the one hand and the biggest trading partner (China) on the other. It was also one 
of the driving forces behind ASEAN’s strategy of great powers’ enmeshment through 
a web of regional consultative institutions (Goh, 2008). Even staunch US allies – Aus-
tralia and Japan- developed elaborate economic relationships with China and actively 
sought additional trade and security partners. This tendency should be interpreted not 
only as an attempt to escape entrapment in dependence on two greatest powers but 
also as an expression of other powers’ new confidence and ambition to play an inde-
pendent role in regional order. Japan seemed to have lost its chance to compete with 
China for regional leadership (at least for some time), but nevertheless consequently 
tries to maintain a position of an independent pole in the regional balance of power. 
East Asia’s middle powers, like South Korea, Australia or Indonesia have been eager 
to use the opportunities created by more open and relaxed post-cold war international 
environment to realise their potential as another generation of “rising powers.” Thanks 
to all this movement the current state of East Asia’ international security environment 
cannot be described as a simple story of ascendant Sino-US bipolarity taking over the 
entire stage. Other players are also working hard to strengthen their autonomy. This 
is visible in manoeuvring by both Pyongyang and Seoul around inter-Korean diplo-
macy, the adoption of revised TPP agreement, or even such moves as the resumption 
of Quadrilateral Dialogue or Japanese constitutional revision plans.
Key eventS in of 2017–18 in eaSt aSia and tHeir imPact  
on regional Security environment
i. new formula for uS policy towards china. At the turn of 2017 and 2018 the 
Trump administration has published a package of strategic documents which is 
meant to set the parameters for US security policy both globally and regionally. It 
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consists of the National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy (with only 
a short summary available publicly) and Nuclear Posture Review. All three are based 
on a common assessment of renewed great power competition as the defining char-
acteristic of the current international security environment. Special attention has 
been given to China as potentially the most challenging (if not outright dangerous) 
competitor (National	Security	Strategy, 2017: 2, 45–46). It is hardly surprising, con-
sidering that, for a long time, China has been seen as the only state capable of join-
ing US among the ranks of superpowers. There is also a long history of American 
anxiety about a Chinese challenge to American pre-eminence in Asian (and perhaps 
even global) order (Kai Liao, 2013). The famous “pivot to Asia” adopted by the 
Obama administration also recognised this reality and was clearly aimed at balanc-
ing the growing Chinese power (it might have also inadvertently heightened threat 
perceptions in Beijing; Feng Zhang, 2018: 16–17). In that sense, the newly adopted 
strategy can be viewed as a continuation of long term trajectory followed by US 
foreign policy. What is new and intriguing is the very explicit naming of China as 
a strategic competitor and outright malign influence in the region. While US policy 
adopted a hedging strategy towards China at least since the beginning of the 21st 
century it also avoided open branding of China as a threat. It seems that the Trump 
administration has abandoned this niceties in favour of blunt recognition of bilateral 
relationship’s adversarial character. Moreover, the confrontational rhetoric has been 
put to practice on the economic front in the form of threatening punitive tariffs on 
Chinese products and increasing hostility to Chinese investment in the US. Although 
the outcome of this significant trade tensions is still uncertain at the time of writ-
ing, this actions have wider implications for mid- and long-term trajectory of Sino-
American relations. For the last two decades trade and investment have been the part 
of the bilateral relationship which accounted for stabilisation, managing tensions 
and growing cooperation. Business interests in the US were among prime supporters 
of more congenial relations with Beijing. It became something akin to an article of 
faith among observers that no matter how heated the disputes concerning a host of 
political and strategic issues, the depth of economic bonds and the scale of potential 
losses from its disruption will work as a brake on tensions spiralling out of control. 
Currently economic matters are becoming another focal point of US-China antago-
nism. That might make the overall relationship more unstable and confrontational 
in the future. It is relatively easy to ascribe this new dynamic to the peculiarities of 
the Trump administration and its intensive pursuit of new equilibrium in American 
international trade position. However, another aspect of this situation is the growing 
sentiment of resentment and mistrust towards China taking hold across US policy-
making, business and opinion shaping circles.1 This means that the spectre of a trade 
war may not recede with the future change of administration in Washington.
ii. 19th communist Party of china congress and Prc’s new foreign poli-
cy assertiveness. The five-yearly Congress of the party ruling the PRC is definitely 
a domestic politics affair. However, the 19th Congress had important foreign policy 
1 This trend can be illustrated by the nature and tone of discourse on Sino-American relations 
taking place in United States and the wider West. It can be exemplified by such texts as: Buruma 
2017, Rehman, Auslin, et. al 2018, The Economist 2018 b.
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implications. This stems from three main factors: 1) it has cemented the power of Xi 
Jinping, thus ensuring that his vision and priorities will guide PRC’s foreign policy in 
the coming years; 2) it provided a forum for the newly re-elected secretary general to 
present a vision of ambitious foreign policy designed to ensure China’s place as one of 
the world’s leading powers; 3) all of this happened in the background of a newly activ-
ist foreign and security policy marking the gradual abandonment of Deng Xiaoping’s 
28-character instruction. All three factors are naturally closely interlinked with one 
another. The congress has confirmed Xi Jinping’s role as hexin (“core”) of China’s rul-
ing party. There seems to be a consensus in the Chinese politics watching community 
that Xi Jinping has amassed personal power unseen in the PRC’s political system since 
the times of Deng Xiaoping (or for some even from Mao Zedong’s). By this he has 
also broken the tradition of collective leadership introduced by Deng Xiaoping. The 
vision of China’s international role laid out by the secretary general in his hallmark 
speech is a clear brake with Deng Xiaoping’s 28-character instruction which provided 
guidance for PRC’s foreign policy for most of the last two decades. While this previ-
ous dictum suggested to “bide the time” “hide strength” and “keep a low profile,” 
the new vision sets a clear goal for China to “[…] become a global leader in terms of 
composite national strength and international influence” (Xi Jinping, 2017: 25). The 
speech also highlights: “[…] further rise in China’s international influence, ability to 
inspire, and power to shape […]” (ibid.: 6). This is clearly a vision of a confident and 
ascendant state which is willing and able to take the role of a key world power. We can 
clearly see that this vision has already been put into practice. It is worth to name three 
examples of what I would call China’s newly activist and assertive foreign and security 
policy. First, in May 2017 Beijing has hosted the first Belt and Road Forum for Interna-
tional Cooperation. Although the meeting itself didn’t bring significant breakthroughs 
(Tiezzi, 2017) it was a mighty display of scale and ambition standing behind this sig-
nature project. Since being first proposed in 2013 the BRI (under changing names) 
has been seen as not only an economic undertaking but also a geopolitical project. If 
fully realized it could lead to the creation of China centered economic block spanning 
large swathes of Eurasia. Second, 2017 has witnessed the opening of China’s first 
permanent overseas military base in Djibouti. Sitting alongside a similar American fa-
cility (with neighborly relations growing complicated recently; Trevithik, 2018a) it is 
a living proof of China’s desire to project military power beyond its immediate neigh-
borhood. Coupled with other military developments, like a dynamic aircraft carrier 
program or the increase in marine infantry forces, it points towards greater emphasis 
on expeditionary operations and power projection in China’s defence policy. Finally 
2017 and 2018 brought increased militarization of China-claimed features in the South 
China Sea. Contradicting previous statements by Chinese leaders, significant military 
capabilities have been placed in the area. (Trevithik, 2018b) They not only increase 
People Liberation Army’s ability to potentially restrict aerial and maritime navigation 
in the SCS, but also indicate that Beijing is no longer that much concerned about pro-
jecting a benign image of a “peacefully rising” country. To summarize, Chinese policy 
is evolving towards great power confidence and ambitious overseas overtures. This 
raises concern in the US and other regional countries which leads to aforementioned 
changes in their regional strategies.
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iii. the unceasing Korean nuclear crisis. 2017 had been a year of increased ten-
sions on the Korean Peninsula. Their primary cause was the apparent addition of Inter-
continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and thermonuclear weapons into North Korea’s 
arsenal. This in turn brought escalating rhetoric and so called “maximum pressure” from 
United States motivated by the Trump administration’s desire to deny Pyongyang the 
ability to hit US mainland. It is not the purpose of this article to recount all the twists 
and turns of missile tests, threats, counterthreats and then the sudden breakout of détente 
brought by first inter-Korean summit in a decade, quickly followed by a promise of first 
DPRK-US leaders’ summit (whose actual conclusion remained uncertain at the time 
of the writing). The question I will try to answer is: what are the implications of these 
changes for East Asia’s international security environment? First and foremost (as pre-
dicted in the previous instalment of this series) North Korea seems to become a mature 
nuclear power. Naturally, it is impossible to verify with certainty whether new ICBMs 
and thermonuclear warheads are truly operational. Nevertheless, tests conducted in 2017 
make it plausible and other actors seem to operate under assumption that they are real. 
This significantly increases DPRK’s ability to deter potential threats to its regime’s sur-
vival. Despite many hints at the possibility of a pre-emptive strike, United States re-
frained from any meaningful military action against the North. This should be explained 
by US leaders’ unwillingness to risk a nuclear attack on their homeland. The argument 
put forward in last year’s article seems to hold water – North Korea’s growing nuclear 
arsenal is actually increasing the stability on the Korean Peninsula (at least in the short 
to medium term) by maximising all actors’ preference for the maintenance of the ter-
ritorial and political status quo. Naturally, we need to take into account the potential for 
miscalculation and further nuclear proliferation in response to Pyongyang’s advances. 
Kim Jong Un’s regime willingness to engage in dialogue with Seoul and Washington 
is a sign of this newly acquired confidence. Having increased his regime’s chances of 
survival, the supreme leader decided to deescalate tensions and make far-reaching offers 
of potential (if still not precisely specified) future concessions (like the denucleariza-
tion of the Peninsula). Such a move gives the North Korean regime several benefits: it 
lowers the overall tensions and threat levels, improves state’s and leader’s international 
image and potentially creates discord in opposing alliances (US, South Korea, Japan). 
There is a near consensus among Korea watchers that actual prospects for incoming 
talks ending with denuclearisation are slim if not outright non-existent. The reason for 
that is the nuclear arsenal’s role as a guarantor of regime survival. For that reason the 
intense North-South diplomacy might be viewed as a part of the overarching trend to-
wards lesser powers seeking more autonomy from the region’s growing bipolarity. By 
acquiring a semblance of an effective deterrent vis-à-vis United States and taking the 
initiative in inter-Korea relations Kin Jong Un’s regime has not only further insulated 
itself from American pressure, but also increased its autonomy from its only treaty ally 
– People’s Republic of China. For some time it seemed that Chinese leadership had 
been increasingly impatient with Pyongyang’s belligerence and tried (at least symboli-
cally) to distance itself from its troublesome ally. China has subscribed to new strict 
sanctions against North Korea (even if their full implementation has been the subject of 
some serious doubts; Panda, 2017). This seemed to start changing with resumption of 
high level visits between the two states, as seen in Kim Jong Un’s two visits in China 
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taking place in the first half of 2018 (Tiezzi, 2018). It can be argued that new military 
capabilities have decreased Pyongyang’s reliance on implicit (or maybe speculative) 
Chinese security guarantees, while the newly initiated détente fulfilled some of the Chi-
nese expectations. Simultaneously both approaches reinforced Kim Jong Un’s position 
as an independent leader who himself decides when to threaten the world and when to 
extend an olive branch. At the same time, South Korean government of president Moon 
Jae-in has become an active player, virtually setting the agenda and leading its American 
ally to follow it. It is difficult to expect that South Korean authorities genuinely believe 
that the talks will lead to lasting peace and denuclearisation. However, they strengthen 
president Moon Jae-in’s domestic position and allow the Republic to be an active player 
shaping its international environment rather than a bystander waiting for decisions taken 
in Washington or Beijing.
iv. the resumption of Quadrilateral dialogue. In November 2017 an India-
Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific have been held in Manila, on the 
side lines of East Asia Summit. Although the meeting itself didn’t produce ground 
breaking conclusions it had attracted a lot of interest. This is primarily because it sig-
nifies a return to Quadrilateral Dialogue (popularly known as the Quad) between ma-
jor Indo-Pacific powers. This initiative enjoyed a short life a decade ago and then 
disappeared for quite a long time (Madan, 2017). For quite some time change from 
a hub-and-spoke system of bilateral US alliances towards a multilateral format has 
been advocated (Tow, Auslin, et al., 2008). A mismatch between partners’ foreign and 
domestic policy priorities seemed to be the main obstacle to its realization. The main 
issue with the Quad is that at its core (and despite loud protestations) it should be 
viewed as an anti-China coalition. That is the reason why it didn’t work longer in its 
first iteration. In the regional security environment of the 21st century’s first decade, 
most states put a premium on cooperating with China rather than appearing to actively 
balance it (Madan, 2017). However, now (as mentioned on several occasions in this 
article) the situation changed. All of the Quad’s members feel a growing pressure from 
rising China. That probably provided rationale for reinstating the Dialogue. Regional 
effects of this restart can be summarised in several points: 1) it is a coup for US di-
plomacy, with more confrontational stance towards China in the offing, the Quad is 
a sign that Washington can at least start to build a coalition of like-minded states to 
support it 2) for the same reason Quad’s re-emergence will only increase Chinese 
fears of encirclement by US and its allies, deepening the mutual mistrust and tensions. 
3) paradoxically, for junior US allies (like Australia and Japan) the Quad might serve 
as a small step towards increasing their autonomy from superpower patron/partner. 
In a multilateral forum their negotiating position is stronger than in a purely bilateral 
interaction. Taking these three points into consideration, the Quad can be perceived at 
least in two ways. On the one side as another step towards building opposing politico-
military blocs in bipolar East Asia. On the other as a means for lesser powers to both 
balance rising Chinese challenge and somewhat constrain or influence their potential 
or actual ally trough a multilateral engagement. Above, all it must be remembered 
that little of substance has come out from Quad thus far. It might potentially lead to 
creation of a new regional security institution, as well as remain just an option for its 
participants to exercise or not, depending on the current situation.
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v. Signing of the comprehensive and Progressive agreement for the trans-Pa-
cific Partnership (TPP-11). President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership is rightly considered to be the most momentous shift in Asia-
Pacific policy instituted by his administration so far. TPP has been widely perceived as 
one of the pillars supporting Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy. If fully realized 
it would in effect create a huge trading bloc centred on United States providing a coun-
terbalance to China’s centrality in regional trade and investment. The fact that other 
11 signatories decided to continue the negotiations and sign an amended agreement in 
March 2018 attests to the value this varied group of states puts in development of trade 
relations. Implications are several fold. It seems that regional states are eager to main-
tain and even deepen the bonds of economic interdependence in which they are deeply 
enmeshed. It has not escaped observers’ attention that Asia-Pacific seems to be among 
world regions with the most positive view of economic globalization (What, 2018). At 
the same time the agreement has significant geopolitical underpinnings. Liberalisation 
of trade between its signatories creates an alternative for dependence on China as the 
main trading partner. This has certainly been an important consideration for Japan to 
promote the salvaging of TPP. At the same time by (surprisingly for many) success-
fully concluding the agreement despite US withdrawal, other signatories have shown 
their independence in driving the regional trade agenda. It is also noteworthy that the 
option for US to join the TPP-11 at a later date is still open, so in the future it may 
return as a US-led economic bloc.
vi. accusations of chinese interference in australia’s domestic politics. In De-
cember 2017 Australian politics has been rocked by a scandal centred on accusations 
of foreign (ie. Chinese) interference. Labour party senator Sam Dastyari was forced to 
resigned after it emerged that he has received donations from a Chinese businessman 
which might have led him to adopt a strongly pro-China public stance. It later emerged 
that “foreign money” has found its way into pockets of more politicians across the po-
litical spectrum. (Harrison, 2017) This development might be viewed as local political 
drama not affecting the regional security environment of East Asia. However, I would 
argue that it is important, as a sign of a broader trend of stiffening attitudes towards 
China across several regional states. In the previous decade Beijing was on a “charm 
offensive” throughout the region, and a quite successful one for that matter. Chinese 
diplomacy had been successful in convincing many states to the sincerity of its “peace-
ful rise/development” concept. Even many US allies (like Australia) embraced grow-
ing economic ties with China and tried to perform a balancing act between these and 
their alliance commitments to United States. With time, however, attitudes changed. 
Australia is an interesting bellwether for this trends. It used to embrace China’s rise 
(at least in economic terms) and actively court Chinese investments and immigrants. 
However, questions began to be raised about the relationship between these seemingly 
commercial or private actors and the Chinese party-state. Investment coming from 
the PRC has been increasingly viewed with suspicion as a way to take control of Aus-
tralia’s strategic assets (Harrison, 2017). The Dastyari scandal shed greater focus on 
what “The Economist” calls “China’s sharp power” (At	the	sharp, 2017). It basically 
amounts to exercising different levers of non-state influence to shape public debate 
in other states in ways conductive to Beijing’s interests and preferences. The wider 
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lesson from this episode is that China’s growing foreign policy assertiveness creates 
a growing pushback in states which used to be susceptible to PRC’s charm offensive. 
This might be taken as an argument that Beijing’s more confrontational policy is self-
defeating as it increases regional support for US efforts to balance China.
* * *
Analysis presented in the preceding section confirms that the international security 
environment of East Asia is currently shaped by two main trends: growing Sino-US bi-
polarity and lesser powers’ efforts at achieving greater autonomy. Attitudes of Beijing 
and Washington towards one another (as expressed in official policy pronouncements) 
are growing more antagonistic. Both states clearly strive for dominance in the region, 
as expressed by opposing visions expressed in respectively Belt and Road Initiative 
and Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Growing anxiety about overt and covert Chinese 
influence, as evidence in the Australian political scandal, is strengthening polarisa-
tion as US allies and partners close ranks with Washington to balance the looming 
Chinese juggernaut. Quad’s revival is another sign of this trend. On the other hand (as 
already mentioned) it can be viewed as a mechanism enhancing junior partner’s nego-
tiating leverage in dealings with Washington. Similarly, the conclusion of CPTPP can 
be viewed as a sign of both overarching trends. On the one hand, a group of regional 
states has successfully concluded a far reaching trade agreement without any of the 
two major powers. On the other, the option of US joining the pact is still open, thus in 
the future it can become the basis for a US-led trade block competing with one centred 
on China. On the Korean peninsula, both governments engage in intense diplomatic 
manoeuvring in order to increase their autonomy from major power patrons.
Taken together all these developments paint a picture of a region in flux. It clearly 
has two main power centres and several major/middle powers manoeuvring to maintain 
their autonomy and protect their interests. Instead of a clear prognosis regarding the 
future of East Asia’s international security environment the author would like to pose 
four questions. The answer to them will have great impact on the region’s future.
1. What is the essence of Trump administration’s adversarial stance towards China? 
It is important to note that current administration’s attitude to Beijing contains ele-
ments of both bold confrontation and gestures of goodwill signifying willingness 
to maintain cooperation. This is most visible in the on and off threats of tariffs 
and trade war. This sits oddly alongside confrontational rhetoric of the National 
Security Strategy which suggests that the antagonism is being motivated by deeply 
opposing visions of regional order. The question is whether satisfaction of Trump 
administration’s expectations regarding the trade imbalance can lead to accommo-
dation with China? If that were the case, that would paved the way to a more har-
monious relations between the region’s dominant powers. If not that might mean 
that the future truly holds a bipolar contest for dominance over East Asia.
2. Will the current state of economic openness prevail? Economic interdependence is 
among primary factors increasing the stability of East Asia’s international security 
environment. It has consistently worked as a brake on tensions and conflicts. How-
ever, if the region would increasingly divide into relatively closed trading blocs 
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(based for example on BRI and CPTPP) this could create a more escalation-prone 
environment. Current economic tensions between USA and China are potentially 
of great importance, because they undermine the most cooperative aspect of the 
bilateral relationship. Business interests used to mitigate bellicose instincts on both 
sides. Now economic issues become another (perhaps even central) point of con-
tention.
3. How will the future institutional architecture of the region look like? It has already 
been mentioned that East Asia lacks robust and inclusive regional institutions (es-
pecially in the security sphere). At the same time we are witnessing at least several 
initiatives which can lead to creation of new institutions – like BRI, CPTPP and 
the Quad. In order to increase regional stability they would need to be inclusive 
and specifically reach across the emerging bipolar divide. However, there is a clear 
danger that both sides in this divide will increasingly build their own competing 
institutions thus exacerbating the potential for further destabilisation.
Answers to these questions remain open. The general picture of East Asia’s interna-
tional security environment in the middle of 2018 is relatively stable, with conscious 
efforts of almost all major powers to limit tensions. However, the trends outlined in 
this article point toward significant potential for increased strategic rivalry in the not 
so distant future.
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aBStract
The international security environment of East Asia is undergoing dynamic changes. This ar-
ticle is another instalment in a series of analysis initiated by the “Strategic Review” in 2017. 
It deals with international security situation in various regions. The article’s main aim is to 
present the influence of selected international events of 2017’s second half and 2018s first half 
on the evolution of East Asia’s long term international security environment. In order to achieve 
this aim the author has posed two research questions: what long term trends have the strongest 
influence on international security environment of East Asia? and, do key events of 2017–18 
increase or decrease stability of the regional security environment? Following research methods 
have been adopted to solve this research problem: the comparative method, legal-institutional 
analysis and forecasting method based on identification of key trends shaping the evolution 
of the studied phenomenon. The main conclusions are twofold. First, the most important long 
term trends shaping the international security environment of East Asia are, on the one side, the 
growing bipolarity of the regional order (with US and PRC as main protagonists) and, on the 
other side, other player’s attempts to increase the degree of their own autonomy. The events of 
2017–18 show that almost all regional powers act to limit the tensions. It doesn’t change the 
fact that long term trends point towards a growing confrontation of two contradictory visions of 
regional order – one championed by USA, and the other by PRC.
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ŚRODOWISKO STRATEGICZNE AZJI WSCHODNIEJ 2017–2018.  
ANALIZA KLUCZOWYCH TRENDÓW I ZAGADNIEŃ 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Międzynarodowe środowisko bezpieczeństwa Azji Wschodniej podlega obecnie dynamicznym 
przemianom. Niniejszy artykuł stanowi kolejną edycję serii analiz sytuacji bezpieczeństwa 
międzynarodowego w poszczególnych regionach świata zainicjowanej w 2017 r. przez „Prze-
gląd Strategiczny”. Jego zasadniczym celem jest ukazanie wpływu wybranych wydarzeń mię-
dzynarodowych drugiej połowy 2017 i pierwszej połowy 2018 r. na długoterminową ewolucję 
międzynarodowego środowiska bezpieczeństwa Azji Wschodniej. Dla jego osiągnięcia autor 
postawił dwa pytania badawcze: jakie długoterminowe trendy w największym stopniu kształtu-
ją międzynarodowe środowisko bezpieczeństwa Azji Wschodniej?, jak również: Czy kluczowe 
wydarzenia okresu 2017–2018 wzmacniają czy też zmniejszają stabilność międzynarodowego 
środowiska bezpieczeństwa badanego regionu? Dla rozwiązania tak zakreślonego problemu 
badawczego posłużono się metodą porównawczą, analizą prawno-instytucjonalną oraz metodą 
prognostyczną opartą na identyfikacji kluczowych trendów kształtujących ewolucję badanego 
zjawiska. Zasadnicze konkluzje sprowadzają się do dwóch punktów. Po pierwsze, najważniej-
szymi długoterminowymi trendami kształtującymi międzynarodowe środowisko bezpieczeń-
stwa Azji Wschodniej, są z jednej strony rosnąca dwubiegunowość ładu regionalnego (z udzia-
łem USA i ChRL), a z drugiej dążenie pozostałych graczy do zwiększenia zakresu własnej 
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autonomii. Wydarzenia okresu 2017–18 pokazują, iż prawie wszystkie potęgi regionalne dążą 
do ograniczenia napięć. Nie zmienia to jednak faktu, iż długoterminowe trendy wskazują na 
rosnącą konfrontację dwóch sprzecznych wizji ładu regionalnego – jedną proponowaną przez 
USA, a drugą przez ChRL.
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